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SYMPOSIUM: THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

William P. Marshall*
Vivian E. Hamilton"
John E. Taylor***
On April 12 and 13, 2007, the West Virginia University College of Law
and the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy hosted a symposium
entitled The Religion Clauses in the 21st Century. It was our privilege to organize the symposium, and we are pleased to be able to present its proceedings in
this issue of the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW.

Few subjects in American constitutional law capture the public's interest and inflame its passions more than the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.
The recent history of those Clauses has given the public and the legal academy
plenty to talk about. Over the past two decades, the Rehnquist Court made substantial changes to free exercise law through its decision in Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith' and to Establishment
Clause funding law through a line of cases culminating in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris.2 The Rehnquist Court also adopted Justice O'Connor's "endorsement
test" to evaluate government religious speech,3 though the Court's commitment
to this test was called into doubt by its 2005 decisions in two cases involving
government displays of the Ten Commandments.4 Today, the Roberts Court
may be on the verge of further doctrinal change. It has already moved to limit
standing under the Establishment Clause, 5 and Steven Gey suggests in his contribution to this symposium that it will eventually move to deconstitutionalize
Establishment Clause issues altogether by allowing church-state disputes to be
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McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v Perry, 545 U.S. 677
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Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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resolved through local political processes.6 In light of all these doctrinal shifts,
we thought the time was ripe for an examination of what the Religion Clauses
will mean as we move further into the 21 st Century. We invited some of the
country's leading scholars to Morgantown, West Virginia, to help us conduct
that examination.
The symposium included four panels organized around different themes
as well as featured addresses by two of the most influential scholars currently
writing about the law of church and state, Steven Gey and Douglas Laycock.
The oral presentations and discussions during the symposium were consistently
engaging. As participants listened to each other during the symposium and revised their work over the summer, the dialogue begun in Morgantown was carried to another level. These papers provide an invaluable window on the current
state of Religion Clauses doctrine and theory.
Steven Gey's paper prepares us for Life After the Establishment

Clause.7 He predicts that in the next few years the Roberts Court will continue a
paradigm shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that will completely displace any remaining vestiges of separationism with an approach that would integrate church and state. Gey discusses five key themes of this new integrationist approach and suggests that together they endorse a frankly majoritarian approach to church-state issues that is both inconsistent with the best of our constitutional heritage and insensitive to the country's changing religious demographics. He concludes, however, that this integrationist approach will not be viable
over the long haul and that the pendulum will swing back towards separationism
in the not too distant future.
Douglas Laycock's paper, Substantive NeutralityRevisited,8 narrates the

history of one of his best-known ideas and defends it against alternative proposals made by Steven Gey and Noah Feldman. The norm of substantive neutrality
directs that government should seek to systematically minimize its impact on
private religious choices, and Laycock contends that it offers a coherent and
normatively attractive approach to issues of church and state. He further argues
that substantive neutrality can largely explain the votes of median Justices Kennedy and O'Connor and consequently can explain much of the Rehnquist
Court's approach to the Establishment Clause (if not the Free Exercise Clause).
The papers from the first symposium panel, "The Religion Clauses in
Institutional Contexts," explore the functioning of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses in the context of two extremely important government institutions: the military and the public schools. Chip Lupu and Robert Tuttle present
the most thorough treatment yet written of the constitutional issues surrounding
the military chaplaincy. 9 They argue that the existence of the chaplaincy is best
6

Steven G. Gey, Life After the EstablishmentClause, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (2007).
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Gey, supra note 6.
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 51 (2007).
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Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy
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seen and defended as a permissible accommodation of the religious needs of
service personnel. Lupu and Tuttle then apply the law of religious accommodations to several specific issues regarding the military chaplaincy that have provoked controversy in recent years, including the policies used in hiring, promoting, and retaining chaplains; the content of chaplains' prayers during official
service functions, and the propriety of proselytizing by chaplains in certain pastoral care settings. In a detailed response to Lupu's and Tuttle's paper, Steven
Green argues that most courts and commentators have underestimated the severity of the Establishment Clause problems raised by the military chaplaincy.' 0
Green agrees with Lupu and Tuttle that the chaplaincy is best defended as an
accommodation of religion, but suggests that the current law of religious accommodations may need to become more permissive for the chaplaincy to pass
muster under an honest analysis.
Turning from the military context to the public schools, Kristi Bowman's paper explores the parameters of the protection the Free Speech Clause
provides for student religious expression." Focusing on some recent cases involving student T-shirts with provocative religious messages, she asks whether
school suppression of those messages under the standards adopted in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District12 would constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Through a careful reading of all the
Court's student speech precedents including its recent decision in Morse v. Frederick,13 Bowman suggests that the law of student speech may allow schools to
discriminate against religious viewpoints that prove especially disruptive or that
unduly interfere with the rights of others. John Taylor responds to Bowman's
article by explaining how and why the Free Speech Clause rather than the Free
Exercise Clause has come to be the primary protector of student religious
speech in the public schools.14 He argues that the dominance of the Free Speech
Clause is constitutionally necessary, for any use of the Free Exercise Clause to
privilege religious speech because of its religious character would be impermissible content discrimination under the Speech Clause.
The next set of papers emerged from the symposium panel on "Government Religious Expression," always a contentious issue in public debates
about the Religion Clauses. The principal papers here both take their starting
points from the Supreme Court's fractured decisions in McCreary County v.
ACLU of Kentucky15 and Van Orden v. Perry. 6 In their contribution, Fred Ge10

Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable:Military Chaplains and the FirstAmend-

ment, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 167 (2007).
"
Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination,
110W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2007).
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393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
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John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223 (2007).
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545 U.S. 844 (2005).
545 U.S. 677 (2005).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. I110

dicks and Roger Hendrix explore the implications of Justice Scalia's arguments
in his McCreary County dissent that the Establishment Clause allows government to endorse monotheism.17 They show that Justice Scalia's position is the
latest attempt to invoke a Judeo-Christian "civil religion" as a force that can
unify a diverse nation, but argue that this project is doomed to failure because
the changing demographics of religion in the United States make it increasingly
difficult to believe that a Judeo-Christian civil religion-or any civil religion-can produce unity rather than division. This is all the more true, they suggest, because the supposedly inclusive symbols of American civil religion are
increasingly understood to carry sectarian messages associated with conservative forms of Christianity. Steven Smith challenges this last claim, which he8
dubs the "sectarianization thesis," in his response to Gedicks and Hendrix.1
According to Smith, it does not follow as a conceptual matter that the inclusive
character of civil religion is illusory simply because some people may attach
specific, sectarian meaning to public religious symbols like Ten Commandments monuments. This, Smith says, is just one more illustration of the truth
that people often agree about generalities and disagree about specifics. Where
this is so, usually both the agreement and the disagreement are real and should
be acknowledged as such. Smith also sees little evidence that as an empirical
matter people actually understand public religious symbols as a coded endorsement of conservative Christian values. The real question, Smith says, is whether
we want to undermine the legitimating and unifying force that public religious
symbols may still possess when it is unclear what can replace their role as
sources of political community.
Dan Conkle takes his cue from Justice Breyer's Van Orden concurrence, exploring the possibility that we might abandon the search for a rulebased approach to evaluating government religious expression under the Establishment Clause and instead adopt a more flexible standard that would consider
four variables: the degree to which the government's religious expression involves coercion or aggressive imposition of a religious message, the nature and
specificity of the expression (e.g., prayer vs. affirmation, sectarian vs. nonsectarian), the traditional character of the expression, and the degree to which the
expression might be seen as private rather than public.' 9 While Conkle remains
ambivalent about whether such a standard-based approach would be jurisprudentially wise, he demonstrates its utility in explaining the pattern of the Supreme Court's decisions on government religious expression.

17

Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianityand the 10

Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 275 (2007).
18
Steven D. Smith, "Sectarianizing" Civil Religion?: A Comment on Gedicks and Hendrix,
110 W. VA. L. REv. 307 (2007).
19
Daniel 0. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in Governmental
Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard,110 W. VA. L. REv. 315 (2007).
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The third panel of the symposium was entitled "Accommodation of Religion." The papers by Kent Greenawalt 2 and Carl Esbeck 2' both attempt to
synthesize the Supreme Court's case law concerning the degree to which the
Establishment Clause limits discretionary governmental accommodations of
religious practice. They differ largely in their degrees of optimism about the
extent to which a satisfying and decision-guiding synthesis can be achieved.
Greenawalt's contribution identifies a number of factors that seem critical for
determining when government has crossed the line that separates permissible
accommodation from forbidden establishment. A valid accommodation must
(1) relieve a relevant burden on religious practice, (2) not grant relief far more
extensive than the burden to which it responds, (3) not be intrinsically unconstitutional (e.g., because it assigns political authority to a religious group), (4) not
impose unacceptable burdens on those who do not benefit from the accommodation, and (5) classify beneficiaries in an appropriate (e.g., denominationally neutral) way. These factors help courts to focus on the proper questions, but often
they do not eliminate the need for line-drawing that turns on "subtle nuances"
and "matters of degree., 22 Responding to Greenawalt, Esbeck grounds his account of accommodation on the Establishment Clause principle he labels "voluntaryism," meaning "that government is not to be actively involved in funding
or otherwise supporting organized religion as religion. 2 3 So understood, the
Establishment Clause is "pro-religious freedom" but not "pro-religion." For
Esbeck, it follows that efforts to accommodate religion are generally permissible. He argues that the law of accommodations is a good deal simpler and more
predictable than is commonly thought, and formulates ten "black-letter" rules
that summarize this law.
Angela Carmella's paper moves to somewhat different ground within
the general territory of religious accommodations. 24 She proposes a unified
approach to both legislative and judicial religious exemptions which would be
guided by the question of whether particular exemptions serve the common
good as that concept is understood in Catholic social thought. In her view, this
approach calls religious institutions and individuals to responsible freedom.
Exemptions need not be seen as a license to ignore the common good; instead,
they may rest on a recognition that the ethical and legal norms of religious
communities may guide conduct towards the common good as effectively as the
norms laid down the state. In her response to Carmella's paper, Laura Underkuffler emphasizes the extent to which Carmella's approach involves a radi20

Kent Greenawalt, EstablishmentClause Limitations on Free Exercise Accommodations, I 10

W. VA. L. REV. 343 (2007).
21

Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause:

Regularizing the Supreme Court'sAnalysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359 (2007).
23

Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 357.
Esbeck, supra note 21, at 396.

24

Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal

22

Pluralism,and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403 (2007).
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cal departure from the way we ordinarily think about religious exemptions.2 5
The usual approach is to think that religious exemptions are justifiable, if they
are, because the state is not competent to question or assess claims of religious
value. In contrast, to evaluate religious exemption claims by reference to the
common good is to openly acknowledge that the state must judge religions
against its own schemes of value. For Underkuffler, however, appreciating the
radicalism of Carmella's proposal is a prelude to praise rather than scorn. She
suggests that in the long run religious exemptions may only be sustainable in
American society on terms similar to those proposed by Carmella.
The final set of papers was initially presented during a symposium panel
on "Religion and Politics." Naomi Cahn and June Carbone address this theme
by exploring the influence of religious belief on the regulation of sexuality in
general and on abstinence-only sex education in particular.26 They document
the ways in which the much-discussed gap between "blue states" and "red
states" tends also to track degrees of religious affiliation and different attitudes
toward sex and its regulation by the government. Cahn and Carbone argue that
government policies requiring abstinence-only sex education represent an unhealthy melding of religion and politics, for the available evidence suggests that
abstinence-only education is ineffective in preventing teenage pregnancy and
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. In her response to Cahn and Carbone, Vivian Hamilton emphasizes the ways in which they seem to embrace a
fairly robust version of the ideal of public reason and questions whether that
commitment can be fully justified and defended.2 7 While she shares Cahn's and
Carbone's reservations about abstinence-only sex education, she suggests that
there may be no practical alternative to allowing state experimentation with different approaches and hoping that an appreciation of policy consequences will
ultimately prove more influential than religious ideology.
Like Cahn, Carbone, and Hamilton, Eduardo Pefialver is also concerned
with the proper role of religious argument in public political deliberation. He
manages to shed new light on that complex and much-discussed topic by asking
whether the ideal of public reason might prove counterproductive. 28 Advocates
of public reason, who insist (with varying degrees of stringency) on the exclusion of religious arguments from public deliberation, typically claim that a
commitment to public reason is necessary to avoid the social instability that
might otherwise result from our significant levels of religious pluralism. Pefialver argues, however, that pluralism can also enhance political stability by caus25

Laura S. Underkuffier, Religious Exemptions and the Common Good: A Reply to Professor

Carmella, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 449 (2007).

26

Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. VA.

L. REV. 459 (2007).
27 Vivian E. Hamilton, Religious v. Secular Ideologies and Sex Education: A Response to
Professors Cahn and Carbone, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 501 (2007).
28
Eduardo M. Pefialver, Is Public Reason Counterproductive?, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 515
(2007).
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ing groups to moderate the demands they make of one another. Whether religious pluralism under a given set of social conditions tends to promote or undermine stability is an empirical question that is difficult to answer, but the answer has significant implications for the public reason debate. If religious pluralism actually promotes stability, insisting that religious groups abandon their
native vocabularies for those offered by public reason could undermine political
stability rather than promoting it.
We close this Introduction by expressing our thanks to all the participants whose work gave shape to our vision for a symposium on The Religion
Clauses in the 21st Century. We also owe thanks to the many people at the
American Constitution Society and the West Virginia University College of
Law who gave their time and talents to the symposium. Finally, we thank the
editors and staff of the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW for the hard work and
professionalism they have demonstrated in producing this special symposium
issue.
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